International Migration Cycle and its Effect on Remittance Flows

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Ksenia Bondarenko is a senior lecturer at the School of World Economy, HSE University.

SPIN: 8633-1966

ORCID: 0000-0003-0550-6361

ResearcherID: AAQ-2896-2021

Scopus AuthorID: 57221727156

For citation: Bondarenko, Ksenia, 2023. International Migration Cycle and its Effect on Remittance Flows, Contemporary World Economy. Vol. 1. No 2 (2).

Keywords: international migration, stages of migration, remittances, cross-country analysis.

Abstract

At present, according to the World Bank, the number of migrants (i.e. persons who live in a country other than their country of birth) is about 295 million people or 3.7% of the world population. At the same time, over the past 50 years, the number of migrants has more than tripled. The expansion of migration processes, as a rule, leads to an increase in the volume of remittances, both those sent by migrants to their family’s homeland (to the migrants’ donor country) and those received by the migrants themselves in the recipient country. This study examines the patterns of migration processes between the two countries (the migrants’ donor country and the recipient country) and finds the three stages of migration cycle. The findings show that remittances depend on the stages of migration non-linearly. During the first stage, when migrants decide to migrate and start to leave the donor country for the recipient country, the volume of remittances sent by migrants to their homeland increases, and so does the volume of remittances in the opposite direction. During the second stage, when the recipient country becomes a key destination and the migrant diaspora expands significantly, the remittances sent by the migrants increase, while the received ones decrease or stagnate. During the third stage, when a degree of migrants’ naturalization is high, the volume of remittances sent back decreases (due to the relocation of migrant families), while the received ones, on the contrary, start growing amid the sale of assets in their homeland. Using data from the World Bank, the UN and central (national) banks, the research determines quantitative conditions for the transition from one stage to another based on the concentration of migration flows from the donor country and the share of migrants from specific donor country to the total number of migrants living in the recipient country. Additional findings show that in some cases, when migrants do not intend to live permanently in the recipient country, the volumes of the sent remittances continue to grow even amid very high concentration of migration flows.

1. Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, migration has become one of the most pervasive manifestations of globalization. The number of migrants has more than tripled in the last 50 years: currently, about 295 million people live in a country other than their country of birth (World Bank 2023), representing about 3.7% of the world’s population. Rising migration is one of the main reasons for the increase in international (personal) remittances; the latter reached $794 billion in 2022 (World Bank 2022).

Remittances, in turn, have been historically an important source of support for the donor countries (Chepel and Bondarenko 2015). Throughout the last two years they have become the most important source of external financing for low- and middle-income economies (most of which are migrant-sending countries), surpassing foreign direct investment, official development assistance and portfolio investment flows (World Bank 2022). Eleven out of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN)1 highlight the importance of international mobility and international remittances, while the World Bank Group considers them as vital tools for achieving strategic priorities for global development (World Bank 2023; Mosler and Laczko 2022).

Under these circumstances, there is rising attention of academic community to study the determinants of bilateral international remittances. However, most research in this area focuses either on micro data (i.e. based on surveys of migrants and/or households) or on country-level data, where the studies do not address micro-level factors (Beine, Lodigiani and Vermeulen 2012).

The modelling of bilateral remittances in this study is based on aggregate country data, yet it takes into account micro-level proxies, in particular migrants’ preferences for leaving for a particular country (the latter characterizes their behavior and to some extent predetermines the stages of migration). Such approach allows us to enhance existing approaches for econometric modelling of remittances by more accurately assessing the specificities of bilateral personal remittance flows in the medium and long run. As such, this will contribute to the theory of migration.

2. Stages of International Migration and Remittances

The dynamics of bilateral international remittances is a complex phenomenon that, in addition to the number of migrants abroad, is influenced by both country-level factors of the donor and recipient countries, including demographic, macroeconomic, political, environmental, geographical and other conditions (Bondarenko 2020a; Makhlouf and Kasmaoui 2018; Ratha and Shaw 2007), and micro-level factors such as the migrant’s age and gender (Kock and Sun 2011), marital status, occupation and level of education (Buch et al. 2002; Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo 2003). However, the existing literature only partially addresses the subject of this study. It is important to understand the economic behavior and social position of migrants (and their households) at different stages of the migration cycle, as well as the psychological, economic and social hurdles they have to overcome in order to eventually adapt to society and move from labour migrant to settled immigrant (Mukomel 2011; Bondarenko 2020a).

The answers to these questions lie in the study of migration stages, which are key to predicting changes in migrants’ behavioural attitudes over time and under the influence of external and internal factors (Pukhova et al. 2013; Bhugra and Becker 2005; Bernard, Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014; Zaslavskaya and Rybakovsky 1987). The analysis of these stages allows us to establish a characteristic model of adaptation of a typical migrant during the migration cycle, based on the analysis of migration processes “from the inside,” and to determine their behaviour.

The theory of migration stages has been described in a number of studies, where the analyses were based on quantitative and qualitative indicators of migrants’ adaptation process to life in the recipient country (Toth-Bos, Wisse and Farago 2019; Bernardo et al. 2018; Zimmermann et al. 2017; Zhou 2014; Yehuda-Sternfeld and Mirsky 2014; Carrasco 2010; Yoon and Lee 2010; King et al. 2006; Zaslavskaya and Rybakovsky 1987 and others) or regression modelling of migration decisions (De Jong 2000; Nivalainen 2004). Taking into account the studies of T. Zaslavskaya and L. Rybakovsky (1987) and Toth-Bos, Wiss and Farago (2019), we distinguish three stages of the migration cycle between two countries—a sending country and a migrant-receiving country (Table 1)—in the so-called “international migration cycle.” The stages of the international migration cycle are determined by migrants’ behavioral preferences as to where best to go in order to maximize the efficiency of migration and minimize the risks.

Indicators of behavioral preferences are, in turn, (i) the country concentration of migration flows from the donor country (i.e. how many migrants went to a particular receiving country relative to the total number of those who left the country) and (ii) the share of the donor country’s migrant diaspora relative to the total population of the receiving country. At the same time, the financial behavior of migrants changes significantly throughout the international migration cycle.

The international migration cycle begins when families decide to migrate internationally, and then migrants go abroad and establish (initially chaotically) the first communities in the new country (the receiving country). Migrants begin to arrive in the new country, establishing the first communities there and increasing the size of the migrant diaspora. The first stage usually involves some preparatory costs, and migrant families contribute their savings to the migrant’s move abroad (to cover transport and rental costs, at least initially). During this period, migration flows between the two countries are still developing and only a small number of migrants begin to leave their home country for the recipient country. However, despite the fact that the total income of the migrant diaspora abroad is not yet very high (due to the small number of migrants and their relatively low income levels), as the size of the migrant diaspora in the recipient country grows, the volume of international remittances sent by migrants and the volume of remittances received by migrants from their families as support increases.

In the second stage of international migration, when migrants choose a country to migrate to for some reason (social, cultural, economic, political, etc.), there is a shift in the priorities of choice towards a particular receiving country (i.e. a significant proportion of migrants go to that receiving country). During this period, there is a positive correlation between the time spent in the recipient country and the amount of remittances sent (Massey and Basem 1992; Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López 1997; Brown 1997). A significant increase in the volume of remittances sent occurs, on the one hand, in the context of an increase in the number of migrants and the corresponding expansion of the migrant diaspora (quantitative factor) and, on the other hand, in the context of an increase in the income of each individual migrant due to improved adaptability, professional skills, education, etc. (qualitative factor). Given that the main reasons for migration are economic and that in most cases the family remains in the home country, migrants continue to support their relatives at this stage. At the same time, the volume of remittances received decreases or stagnates, as migrants are already able to provide for themselves abroad.

In the third stage of international migration, there is a high degree of “naturalization” of migrants within the recipient country, and migrants try to move their families, expand their migration networks and occupy a certain position in the host society (Bondarenko and Kharitonova 2023). This means that the migrant community in the new country has not only had time to adapt to the new life, but also to settle down, take root and to some extent integrate into local socio-economic processes. Meanwhile, the financial behavior of migrants (in the absence of significant social barriers) is characterized by a shift in their behavior towards intentions to stay permanently in the recipient country. As a result, migrants form a certain social stratum within the host population, the degree of their naturalization becomes very high, and their numbers become relatively stable.

Thus, the beginning of the third stage can be indicated by (i) the declining share of the migrant diaspora in the total population of the receiving country and (ii) the fact that the receiving country remains a major destination for migrants. At this point, for migrants who decide to stay abroad, migration is no longer a temporary phenomenon (such as labor migration) but a permanent one—a process of deeper assimilation of migrants takes place (Holst and Schrooten 2006).

In the third stage, the volume of remittances to the home country decreases. Any further motives for migrants to help remaining family members—parents or relatives—are in most cases based solely on altruistic motives or a sense of internal duty (Grigoryev et al. 2008). In addition, migrants begin to sell property and assets they have inherited and/or own in their home country (Morrow-Jones 1988; Analytical Centre 2016) in order to buy property in the recipient country and stay there permanently. As a result, the decline in remittances received by migrants in the recipient country from their family in the donor country to support the migrant abroad, characteristic of the second stage, is partially (or in some cases fully) mitigated by an increase in remittances realised from the sale of assets.

This allows us to identify three key stages in the cash transfer cycle, each of which corresponds to a stage in the international migration cycle (Table 1).

Table 1. Stages of migration processes and the cash transfer cycle

“The three stages of the migration process” (T. Zaslavskaya, L. Rybakovsky 1987)

Migration stages depending on the purpose of migration (Toth-Bos, Wisse and Farago 2019).

The international migration cycle (two-way flows at the country level)

Bilateral remittances cycle (two-way flows at the country level)

1. making the decision to migrate

1. pre-migration stage

 

 1. Decision to migrate, migration and formation of the first community in the recipient country

1. Increase in remittances sent home and increase in remittances received by migrants (as temporary support)

2. migration

2. during migration stage

 

2. The recipient country becomes a key destination for migrants, the migrant diaspora continues to grow

2. Increase in remittances sent home and decrease/stagnation in remittances received by migrants

3. adaptation / adaptability

3. High degree of naturalization among migrants, as evidenced by: (i) the recipient country remaining a key destination for migrants and (ii) the high proportion of the migrant diaspora in relation to the total population of the recipient country

3. Decrease in net remittances against a background of (i) a fall in the amount of cash sent home and (ii) an increase in remittances received due to asset sales (as a result), which partially (or fully) offsets the decline in remittances received in the previous phase

 

3. post-migration stage / repatriation

 

 

Source: Compiled by the author; Zaslavskaya, Rybakovsky (1987); Toth-Bos, Wisse and Farago (2019).

A cross-country econometric analysis was conducted to test the above conclusions about the existence of three stages of the international migration cycle and three stages of the cash transfer cycle.

3. Research Method and Data

The modelling of remittances flows is carried out using a multivariate regression model based on panel data: index i represents the number of each observed recipient-donor country pair (e.g. Germany-Turkey in the case of Turks migrating to Germany or Russia-Belarus in the context of migration flows from Belarus to Russia), t is time expressed in years. The control variables are defined according to the literature review conducted (Makhlouf and Kasmaoui 2018; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz 2007; Schiopu and Siegfried 2006; Alper and Neyapti 2006; and Chami et al. 2003). The theoretical model of sent remittances (1) from the migrant recipient country is summarised as follows:

(1) LSentit = β0 + β1lmstockit + β2RecGrowthit + β3Dongrowthit + β4diffGDPit +β5giniit + β6lfxit + β7ltradeit + β8ldistit + β9colonyit + β10comlangit + β11RecCrisisit + β12DonCrisisit + εit

In model (1), the dependent variable –LSentit – is the logarithm of remittances sent from the migrant-recipient country to the migrant-donor country.

The remaining variables are independent variables, including: lmstockit – logarithm of the variable “number of migrants from the donor country living in the recipient country,” RecGrowthit  real GDP growth of the migrant recipient country,  Dongrowthit  real GDP growth of the migrant donor country, diffGDPit the logarithm of the difference between GDP per capita at PPP of the recipient country and the migrant donor country, giniit  Gini coefficient of the migrant recipient country (standardised),  lfxit – logarithm of the cross rate of the currencies of the two countries (calculated through the cross rate to the US dollar), ltradeit – logarithm of bilateral trade volume of the two countries, ldistit – the logarithm of the distance between the key cities or agglomerations of the two countries, colonyit – dummy variable, reflects the presence (1) or absence (0) of colonial ties between the two countries, comlangit – dummy variable, reflects the presence (1) or absence (0) of a single official language in both countries, RecCrisisit  and DonCrisisit – dummy variables, reflect the years of GDP decline (1) of the recipient country and the migrant donor country, respectively, for other years – (0).

The model deliberately does not include the key interest rate of donor and recipient countries, due to the statistical peculiarities of calculating this indicator.2 Also, we do not include inflation because of its high correlation with the exchange rate. A similar approach is followed in a number of other research papers – for example, in the ECB study by Shiopu and Siegfried (2006).

Modelling of the volumes of received remittances is carried out similarly to the approach described above in model (1). In generalized form, the theoretical model of received remittances (2) in the recipient country from the donor country is presented in the following form:

(2) LReceivedit = β0 + β1lmstockit + β2RecGrowthit + β3Dongrowthit + β4diffGDPit +β5giniit + β6lfxit + β7ltradeit + β8ldistit + β9colonyit + β10comlangit + β11RecCrisisit + β12DonCrisisit + εit

In model (2), the dependent variable – LReceivedit – is the logarithm of remittances received by the migrant-recipient country from the migrant-donor country.

Migration stage variables

For the research issue, we examine migration stages, which we define based on (i) the proportion of migrants who left the donor country for a migrant-recipient country of the total number of migrants who left (variable shareleavit) and (ii) the proportion of migrants from the donor country to the total population of the recipient country (variable mig_popit). Both of these variables help determine the significance of the recipient country to migration from the donor country compared to the other countries. In order to test the assumption of non-linear nature of the relationship between the volumes of remittances sent at different stages of migration, we also test the following variables: shareleav2it, shareleav3it  – square and cube of the variable shareleavit, respectively, as well as mig_pop2it and mig_pop3it – respectively the square and cube of the variable mig_popit

Considering the above six variables, we augment model (1) and obtain the following form of the sent cash transfer model (3):

(3) LSentit = β0 + β1lmstockit + β2RecGrowthit + β3Dongrowthit + β4diffGDPit +β5giniit + β6lfxit + β7ltradeit + β8ldistit + β9colonyit + β10comlangit + β11RecCrisisit + β12DonCrisisit + β13shareleavit + β14shareleav2it + β15shareleav3it + β16mig_popit + β17mig_pop2it + β18mig_pop3it + εit

In turn, complementing model (2), the model of received cash remittances (4) will look as follows:

(4) LReceivedit = β0 + β1lmstockit + β2RecGrowthit + β3Dongrowthit + β4diffGDPit +β5giniit + β6lfxit + β7ltradeit + β8ldistit + β9colonyit + β10comlangit + β11RecCrisisit + β12DonCrisisit + β13shareleavit + β14shareleav2it + β15shareleav3it + β16mig_popit + β17mig_pop2it + β18mig_pop3it + εit

The study uses data from the World Bank, UN, IMF, and Mayer and Zignago (2011). There is no single database on annual flows of bilateral remittances in the long run, so we used the approach of Schiopu and Siegfried (2006), who examined statistics on bilateral remittances in European countries and used data from central (national) banks as a reference. In the present study, we searched the websites of 115 central (national) banks around the world for data on bilateral remittances (secondary income debit and credit of the current account balance of payments or remittances) and found relevant statistics over the long term in Austria, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and the US.3

Despite the constraints mentioned above, the present sample fulfils the objectives of this study.

We use data for 221 donor and 218 recipient countries between 1972 and 2021; however, years do vary across individual bilateral flows and not all country pairs data is available. The total count of all bilateral cash transfer flows is 596 (see Appendix 1). Brief descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized below (see Table 2); both the raw values of the variables (without logarithm and without squaring or cube) and the variables used in the model are presented here.

 Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables

Variable

Brief description*

Total

Cf. value

St. off.

Min. value

Max. value

sent

Sent remittances from RC to DC, $mln

12,269

 398

1 246

 0

17,332

lsent

sent logarithm

11,542

2.9

3.2

-7.6

9.8

received

Received remittances to RC from DC, $mln

12,123

 387

1 233

 0

17,332

lreceived

logarithm

11,406

2.9

3.2

-7.6

9.8

mstock

number of migrants to the RC from the DC, people.

29,800

75 098

441 186

 0

1.20E+07

lmstock

logarithm of mstock

17,897

7.7

3.8

0.0

16.3

RecGrowth

Economic growth RC, %

26,672

2.7

5.2

-64.0

150.0

DonGrowth

Economic growth of DC, %

26,688

2.7

5.2

-64.0

150.0

diffGDP

Difference in GDP per capita at PPPs of RC and DC, thousand international dollars.

17,132

0.0

18.8

-145.4

145.4

gini_std

Gini coefficient RC

10,685

37.2

8.0

15.0

75.0

fx

Cross currency exchange rate of DC and RC

27,320

3.90E+08

1.11E+10

 0.0**

6.35E+11

lfx

logarithm of fx

27,320

0.0

3.9

-27.2

27.2

trade

Bilateral trade volume of RC and DC (exports + imports), $mln

16,284

15 714

48 868

 0.0**

664,642

ltrade

logarithm of trade

16,284

6.9

3.3

-9.8

13.4

dist

Distance between countries, km

29,000

6 123

4 283

 60

16 774

ldist

logarithm of ldist

29,000

8.3

1.0

4.1

9.7

colony

There are colonial ties (1)

29,000

0.08

0.27

 0

 1

comlang

There is a common language of communication (1)

29,000

0.06

0.23

 0

 1

RecCrisis

Year of GDP decline (1) RC

29,800

0.17

0.37

 0

 1

DonCrisis

Year of GDP decline (1) DC

29,800

0.17

0.37

 0

 1

shareleav

share of migrants who left DC for RC, %

28,923

3.35

10.90

0

98.3

shareleav2

shareleav square

28,923

1 30.1

671.8

0

9,656.4

shareleav3

shareleav cube

28,923

7 199.1

50 669.4

0

948,899.3

mig_pop

share of migrants from DC to the total RC population, %

29,000

0.3

1.3

0.0

21.7

mig_pop2

square mig_pop

29,000

1.7

16.5

0.0

469.7

mig_pop3

cube mig_pop

29,000

19.9

262.1

0.0

10,181.1

 Note: *RC - recipient country, DC - donor country, **number lower than 0.0001. Source: Author’s calculations using the STATA14 package

The dataset is an unbalanced panel, i.e. many country pairs do not have statistics for all periods—this is due to the statistical characteristics of the data. In this paper, the dataset is presented in a wide panel format, where the number of time periods (t) is far smaller than the number of observation units (i), i.e. i>t (the number of country pairs is more than 430, periods range from two to 60 years).

Multicollinearity is technical: high correlation is characteristic of the variables shareleavit  and its derivatives, as well as for the variable mig_popit and its derivatives (Table 2).

4. Econometric Modelling

In the first stage of the study, end-to-end regressions (ordinary least squares method, OLS), fixed-effect (FE) panel regressions and random-effect (RE) panel regressions were constructed for models (1), (2), (3) and (4) and tests were performed.

For all models in the Breusch-Pagan test, p-level<0.01, so the main hypothesis is dismissed. Thus, random-effects regression describes our data better than end-to-end regression. The Wald and Hausman tests showed that the fixed-effect regression is more preferable, which is expected since specific country pairs were chosen for the study and their composition did not change year to year. However, there are three fixed variables in the regression that do not vary over time,  ldistit, colonyit and comlangit  which were eliminated from the fixed-effect regression. Therefore, due to the invariance of dummy variables, here and further we consider both fixed and random effects regressions (because, unlike fixed-effects regression, the latter allows us to estimate coefficients with time-invariant variables). As for stationarity testing, it is not required in this paper as we use panel data in a wide format, and in the context of panel data, the stationarity problem is specific to long panel datasets when the number of time periods (t) is greater than the number of observation units (i), i.e. t>i (Wooldridge 2015). See Table 3 and Table 4 for the modelling results.

Table 3. Modelling results: volumes of sent remittances

 

[1a] fe

lsent

[1b] re.

lsent

[1c] re.

lsent

[3a] re.

lsent

[3b] re.

lsent

[3c] re.

lsent

[3d] fe

Lsent

lmstock

0.149***

0.173***

0.160***

0.152***

0.136***

0.120***

0.111***

 

(0.0124)

(0.0116)

(0.0119)

(0.0127)

(0.0131)

(0.0134)

(0.0139)

RecGrowth

-0.00620

-0.00694

-0.00839*

-0.00872*

-0.00906*

-0.00904*

-0.00706

 

(0.00499)

(0.00496)

(0.00497)

(0.00498)

(0.00497)

(0.00495)

(0.00498)

DonGrowth

-0.0262***

-0.0247***

-0.0250***

-0.0252***

-0.0258***

-0.0262***

-0.0273***

 

(0.00405)

(0.00403)

(0.00402)

(0.00403)

(0.00403)

(0.00401)

(0.00403)

diffGDP

-0.00693***

-0.00317*

-0.00274

-0.00287

-0.00314*

-0.00375**

-0.00766***

 

(0.00227)

(0.00194)

(0.00194)

(0.00194)

(0.00194)

(0.00193)

(0.00226)

gini

0.0367***

0.0197***

0.0235***

0.0225***

0.0224***

0.0236***

0.0381***

 

(0.00617)

(0.00522)

(0.00541)

(0.00541)

(0.00540)

(0.00539)

(0.00614)

lfx

-0.0134*

-0.0205***

-0.0208***

-0.0200***

-0.0212***

-0.0202***

-0.0135*

 

(0.00753)

(0.00732)

(0.00730)

(0.00732)

(0.00730)

(0.00728)

(0.00750)

ltrade

0.688***

0.678***

0.670***

0.675***

0.673***

0.673***

0.685***

 

(0.0173)

(0.0146)

(0.0150)

(0.0151)

(0.0151)

(0.0150)

(0.0174)

RecCrisis

-0.0618

-0.0620

-0.0667*

-0.0682*

-0.0694*

-0.0722*

-0.0655

 

(0.0410)

(0.0411)

(0.0410)

(0.0411)

(0.0411)

(0.0409)

(0.0409)

DonCrisis

-0.0406

-0.0403

-0.0453

-0.0495

-0.0545

-0.0530

-0.0489

 

(0.0405)

(0.0406)

(0.0406)

(0.0407)

(0.0406)

(0.0404)

(0.0404)

ldist

 

 

-0.133*

-0.140*

-0.126*

-0.115

0

 

 

 

(0.0757)

(0.0749)

(0.0751)

(0.0753)

(.)

colony

 

 

0.831***

0.796***

0.743***

0.776***

0

 

 

 

(0.262)

(0.264)

(0.265)

(0.265)

(.)

comlang

 

 

0.658**

0.656**

0.617**

0.486*

0

 

 

 

(0.293)

(0.289)

(0.290)

(0.291)

(.)

shareleav

 

 

 

0.00668**

0.0250***

0.0446***

0.0397***

 

 

 

 

(0.00286)

(0.00632)

(0.0105)

(0.0115)

shareleav2

 

 

 

 

-0.000338***

-0.00134***

-0.00133***

 

 

 

 

 

(0.0000908)

(0.000375)

(0.000421)

shareleav3

 

 

 

 

 

0.00000997***

0.00000993**

 

 

 

 

 

 

(0.00000361)

(0.00000418)

mig_pop

 

 

 

-0.0315

0.176***

0.653***

0.737***

 

 

 

 

(0.0322)

(0.0707)

(0.110)

(0.118)

mig_pop2

 

 

 

 

-0.0183***

-0.141***

-0.154***

 

 

 

 

 

(0.00548)

(0.0221)

(0.0229)

mig_pop3

 

 

 

 

 

0.00696***

0.00747***

 

 

 

 

 

 

(0.00121)

(0.00124)

cons

-4.083***

-3.688***

-2.709***

-2.630***

-2.651***

-2.709***

-3.959***

 

(0.229)

(0.220)

(0.640)

(0.634)

(0.635)

(0.636)

(0.229)

N - number of observations (country pairs and periods)

4868

4868

4863

4852

4852

4852

4852

i - number of observations (country pairs)

441

441

440

436

436

436

436

R2 within

0.382

0.381

0.382

0.382

0.385

0.391

0.392

R2 overall

0.645

0.671

0.689

0.693

0.691

0.689

0.650

R2 between

0.701

0.720

0.733

0.740

0.739

0.738

0.707

Note. Standard errors are indicated in brackets. Dependent variable is lsentit . ***/**/* - significance of coefficient estimates at 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively. (.) - eliminated (excluded) variables in fixed-effect regression. Source: Author’s calculations using the STATA14 package                                                                    

Regressions with fixed [1a] and random effects [1b] reflect model (1) without accounting for invariant variables, while regression [1c] is a panel regression with random effects that accounts for the ldistit, colonyit and comlangit. Regressions [3a], [3b], [3c] are panel regressions with random effects of model (3), regression [3d] is a panel regression with fixed effects of model (3)—here the invariant variables have been excluded from the model.

Table 4.Modelling results: volumes of remittances received

 

[2a] fe

lreceived

[2b] re.

lreceived

[2c] re.

lreceived

[4a] re.

lreceived

[4b] re.

lreceived

[4c] re.

lreceived

[4d] fe

lreceived

lmstock

0.128***

0.139***

0.125***

0.155***

0.137***

0.128***

0.127***

 

(0.0130)

(0.0120)

(0.0123)

(0.0131)

(0.0135)

(0.0138)

(0.0145)

RecGrowth

-0.0179***

-0.0178***

-0.0193***

-0.0177***

-0.0180***

-0.0180***

-0.0168***

 

(0.00521)

(0.00518)

(0.00519)

(0.00518)

(0.00516)

(0.00516)

(0.00518)

DonGrowth

-0.0179***

-0.0211***

-0.0215***

-0.0215***

-0.0224***

-0.0226***

-0.0193***

 

(0.00419)

(0.00417)

(0.00417)

(0.00415)

(0.00415)

(0.00415)

(0.00417)

diffGDP

-0.00141

-0.00582***

-0.00555***

-0.00582***

-0.00605***

-0.00641***

-0.00219

 

(0.00239)

(0.00200)

(0.00200)

(0.00199)

(0.00198)

(0.00198)

(0.00238)

gini

0.0375***

0.0316***

0.0359***

0.0356***

0.0353***

0.0357***

0.0376***

 

(0.00640)

(0.00532)

(0.00553)

(0.00551)

(0.00549)

(0.00549)

(0.00637)

lfx

0.0136*

0.0163**

0.0163**

0.0136*

0.0117

0.0121

0.00929

 

(0.00814)

(0.00786)

(0.00784)

(0.00782)

(0.00780)

(0.00780)

(0.00810)

ltrade

0.770***

0.731***

0.721***

0.712***

0.709***

0.708***

0.751***

 

(0.0182)

(0.0150)

(0.0153)

(0.0154)

(0.0153)

(0.0153)

(0.0182)

RecCrisis

-0.114***

-0.125***

-0.130***

-0.123***

-0.125***

-0.127***

-0.113***

 

(0.0433)

(0.0434)

(0.0435)

(0.0433)

(0.0433)

(0.0432)

(0.0431)

DonCrisis

-0.0302

-0.0469

-0.0516

-0.0438

-0.0496

-0.0486

-0.0289

 

(0.0423)

(0.0424)

(0.0424)

(0.0423)

(0.0422)

(0.0422)

(0.0420)

ldist

 

 

-0.143**

-0.137*

-0.123*

-0.118*

0

 

 

 

(0.0734)

(0.0725)

(0.0723)

(0.0722)

(.)

colony

 

 

0.862***

1.137***

1.080***

1.096***

0

 

 

 

(0.256)

(0.258)

(0.258)

(0.258)

(.)

comlang

 

 

0.545*

0.592**

0.549**

0.479*

0

 

 

 

(0.287)

(0.283)

(0.282)

(0.282)

(.)

shareleav

 

 

 

-0.0195***

0.00652

0.0199*

0.0264**

 

 

 

 

(0.00292)

(0.00657)

(0.0109)

(0.0121)

shareleav2

 

 

 

 

-0.000455***

-0.00110***

-0.00123***

 

 

 

 

 

(0.0000944)

(0.000381)

(0.000434)

shareleav3

 

 

 

 

 

0.00000632*

0.00000700*

 

 

 

 

 

 

(0.00000363)

(0.00000430)

mig_pop

 

 

 

-0.0132

0.180***

0.418***

0.308***

 

 

 

 

(0.0330)

(0.0727)

(0.114)

(0.125)

mig_pop2

 

 

 

 

-0.0171***

-0.0787***

-0.0633***

 

 

 

 

 

(0.00568)

(0.0231)

(0.0241)

mig_pop3

 

 

 

 

 

0.00348***

0.00288**

 

 

 

 

 

 

(0.00126)

(0.00130)

cons

-4.792***

-4.116***

-3.056***

-3.206***

-3.204***

-3.221***

-4.641***

 

(0.239)

(0.224)

(0.621)

(0.615)

(0.613)

(0.611)

(0.239)

N - number of observations (country pairs

and periods)

4784

4784

4779

4767

4767

4767

4767

i - number of observations (country pairs)

437

437

436

432

432

432

432

R2 within

0.402

0.401

0.402

0.407

0.412

0.413

0.414

R2 overall

0.625

0.634

0.666

0.672

0.670

0.671

0.627

R2 between

0.715

0.724

0.743

0.748

0.747

0.748

0.715

Note. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. Dependent variable is lreceivedit . ***/**/* - significance of coefficient estimates at 1%/5%/10% levels, respectively. (.) - eliminated (excluded) variables in fixed-effect regression. Source: Author’s calculations using STATA1 package 4

Regressions with fixed [2a] and random effects [2b] reflect model (2) without accounting for invariant variables, while regression [2c] is a panel regression with random effects accounting for ldistit, colonyit and comlangit. Regressions [4a], [4b], [4c] are panel regressions with random effects of model (4), regression [4d] is a panel regression with fixed effects of model (4)—here invariant variables were excluded from the model.

All coefficients before explanatory variables in the regression equations above are in line with expectations.

5. Regression Analysis Results Interpretation

Share of migrants who left the donor country in favor of the recipient country

To identify the stages of the bilateral migration cycle, we plotted remittances against the variable shareleavit and its derivatives (shareleav2it and shareleav3it) using the data from the above regression analysis and calculated4 the extrema of functions [3c], [3d], [4c], [4d], which will allow us to determine the conditions of transition from one stage of bilateral migration to another. The functions reflect the dependence of the volumes of sent remittances (LSentit) to the share of migrants who left the recipient country (shareleavit).

The analysis revealed that during the first stage the number of migrants who depart to the recipient country out of the total number of migrants from the donor country does not exceed 10-12% (Figure 1). During this period, both sent and received remittances increase (the latter grows due to the fact that the family supports the migrant abroad during the first stage of migration).

Further, as the concentration of migration flows to a certain country increases, there is a transition from the first to the second stage. Here the volumes of sent remittances continue to grow, while the volumes of received remittances start to decrease at high rates.

Figure 1. Modelling of bilateral flows of international remittances ($ million) depending on the share of migrants who left the donor country in favor of the recipient country (%)

Note. The diamonds indicate function extrema. The maximum value of the share of migrants who left for the recipient country is 98.3%. Source: author’s calculations.

In turn, transition from the second to the third stage occurs when the share of migrants leaving for a particular recipient country starts to exceed 19-22%. The third stage of the bilateral migration cycle, however, has a more complex structure than we previously assumed. From the beginning of the third stage, there is indeed a decline in outward remittances to the donor country from the recipient country, while the decline in outward remittances slows down (probably due to capital flows in the form of asset sales). However, in country pairs with a very high country concentration of migration (i.e., where more than 68-70% of the total number of migrants leave for a particular recipient country5), further migration intensification leads to an increase in sent remittances (Figure 1). We attribute this to cases where mass migration from the donor country to the recipient country is a consequence of well-established channels for temporary employment abroad and the inability (or unwillingness for a variety of reasons) of migrants to change their place of residence.6

Proportion of migrants from the donor country in relation to the total population of the recipient country

In order to identify the stages of the bilateral migration cycle, similarly to the approach described above, we plotted remittances against the variable mig_popit  and its derivatives mig_pop2it and  mig_pop3it using data from the above regression analysis and calculated7 the extrema of functions [3c], [3d], [4c], [4d], which will allow us to determine the conditions of transition from one stage of bilateral migration to another. Equations were also constructed, all other things being equal, ceteris paribus, based on the calculated coefficients of the equations (Table 3, Table 4).

The analysis revealed that during the first and second phases, the share of migrants who reside in the recipient country among its total population does not exceed 3-3.4% (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Modelling of bilateral international transfer flows ($ million) depending on the share of migrants from the donor country in the total population of the recipient country (%)

Note: The diamonds indicate function extrema. The maximum value of the share of migrants from the donor country in the total population of the recipient country is 21.7%. Source: author’s calculations

During this period, the volume of sent remittances grows (migrants send money home), while the volume of received remittances grows initially at a high rate (the first stage of migration, the family supports the migrant at first) and then virtually does not grow (the second stage of migration).

Then, as the share of the migrant population in the recipient country increases, there is a transition to the third stage. Here the volume of remittances sent begins to decrease. Received remittances also decrease at first, but their rate of decrease is significantly lower than that of sent remittances, and as a result net remittances become negative.

This also confirms the complex nature of the third stage. In countries with a very high concentration of migrants from a particular country (i.e. where the share of migrants in the population exceeds 10.5-12%8 of the total population) further growth of the migrant diaspora leads to an increase in the volume of remittances, both sent and received (Figure 2). The growth in the volume of received remittances is evidence of mass relocation of the population abroad. Probable reasons for the growth in the volume of sent remittances are presented in the paragraph above (for example, the growth of entrepreneurial activity and/or the impossibility or lack of desire to leave for permanent residence).

6. Quantitative Conditions of Migration Phases and Country Examples

These calculations allow us to undestand (Table 5) how the degree of adaptation of migrants in the recipient country (which is determined by the cycle of international migration) transforms the patterns of migrants’ financial behaviour.

Table 5. Estimated conditions of the international migration cycle and the remittance cycle

 

The international migration cycle

Cycle of bilateral cash remittances

Share of migrants who left for the recipient country (%)

Share of migrants from the donor country in the population of the recipient country (%)

1

Making the decision to migrate, migration and the formation of the first community in the recipient country

Increase in remittances sent home and increase in cash remittances received by migrants (as temporary support)

Less 10-12%

Less 3.0-3.4%

2

The recipient country becomes a key destination for migrants, the migrant diaspora continues to grow

Increase in remittances sent home and decrease/stagnation in remittances received by migrants

From 10-12%

up to 19-22%

3

High degree of naturalisation of migrants, as evidenced by: (i) the recipient country remaining a key destination for migrants and (ii) a high proportion of the migrant diaspora in relation to the total population of the recipient country

A decline in net remittances as a result of (i) a fall in repatriated cash and (ii) an increase in remittances received due to the sale of assets (as a result), partially (or fully) offsetting the decline in remittances received in the previous phase.

From 19-22% and above

From 3.0-3.4% and above

Source: Compiled by the author

The estimated conditions (Table 5) allow us to identify the stages of bilateral migration for different country pairs and the years of transition from one stage to the other. In the context of the share of migrants in the recipient country, however, the essential question of the population ratio of the two countries remains. If the countries in a country pair have roughly the same population size, the conditions of the variable mig_popit to determine the stages of migration will be representative (in the sample, the median of the ratio of the population of the donor country to the population of the recipient country is equal to one, because for almost every country pair there is an inverse country pair: for example, for DEU/TUR—migration of Turks to Germany there is a pair TUR/DEU - migration of Germans to Turkey). If the population of the donor country significantly exceeds the population of the recipient country, the stages of the migration cycle may be shifted downwards, and upwards in the opposite case.

Total number of country pairs for which data is available (shareleavit and mig_popit) from 1972 to the present for a period of more than one year is 570. Based on the above conditions, 493 pairs are still in the first stage of migration (Appendix 3). As an example, we highlight the following recipient-donor pairs: Argentina-United States, Austria-Slovakia, Bulgaria-Germany, UK-India (despite the increasing share of migrants from India in the total population of the UK in recent years), etc.

Transition from the first to the second stage is observed in the following recipient-donor country pairs: Austria-Czech Republic (second stage since 2010), United States-Singapore (since 2010), Germany-Switzerland (since 2000), United States-India (since 2000), Germany-Estonia (since 1990), Germany-Latvia (since 1990), Germany-Spain (since 2000), Austria-Slovenia (since 2000).

Finally, the following recipient-donor country pairs have gone through three stages of migration since: United States-China (the second stage started in the 1990s and the third in the 2010s), Mexico-United States (the second stage started in the 1990s and the third in the 2010s), Germany-Turkey (the latter went through the first two stages in the 1960s) and others.

The analysis revealed that Russia has been a third-stage recipient country with the countries of the former USSR as migrant donors (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) for many years (Russia is a priority country for migration for more than 40% of people leaving these countries). At the same time, officially published trends of remittances start to show patterns of the third stage of the migration cycle only during the last ten to twenty years, and not yet for all countries—this is probably a consequence of the specifics of migration processes during the USSR period, the uncertainty in the economic situation during the 1990s, restrictions on personal remittances that were in force in the territories of many former USSR member countries in the 1990s to early 2010s, statistical subtleties and specifics of migration from individual countries. For example, the majority of migrants from Uzbekistan are typically labour migrants with the purpose of earning money to improve their financial situation (and the welfare of their family) in their home country, rather than moving to Russia for permanent residence (Bondarenko 2020a). In this case, the volume of sent remittances continues to grow even as the share of departing migrants to the recipient country increases.

7. Conclusion

This study is a continuation of a series of studies on migration cycles and the modelling of remittance flows.

Bilateral migration processes (between a donor country and a recipient country) follow a three-stage process. In the first stage, the decision to migrate is made and the first communities are established in the recipient country. In the second stage, the recipient country gradually becomes a key destination for migrants and the migrant diaspora expands. In the third stage of the migration cycle, there is a high degree of naturalization of migrants, as evidenced by the fact that the recipient country remains a key destination for migrants and the share of the migrant diaspora in the total population of the recipient country becomes high.

The dependence of remittances on the migration cycle is non-linear. To analyze the flows of remittances, econometric modelling of the volumes of (i) remittances sent from the recipient country to the donor country and (ii) remittances received by the recipient country from the donor country was carried out. A synthesis of the existing literature shows that the modelling of remittances is mainly based on country-wide statistics, but does not include microeconomic parameters. In the present study, the stages of the migration cycle are included in the models of remittances sent and received, together with the main macroeconomic parameters. The inclusion of these variables in the model provides a more accurate assessment of the specificity of financial flows between countries: in the case of both sent and received remittances, the model allowed us to identify the non-linear nature of the dependence of remittances on the migration cycle. In the third stage of migration, after a significant increase in the migrant diaspora in the recipient country (also in the context of it becoming a priority destination for migration), there is a decrease in remittances sent from the recipient country to the home country and an increase in personal remittances in the opposite direction.

The proxies for the stages of the migration cycle — i) the share of migrants from the donor country in the total population of the recipient country and ii) the share of those leaving the donor country for a given recipient country — allow us to assess the conditions of transition from one stage to another.

In stages one and two, the share of migrants from the donor country in the total population of the recipient country is low, less than 3.0-3.4%. In the first stage, the share of those leaving the donor country for a given recipient country does not exceed 10-12%, personal remittances sent from the donor country to the recipient country increase, and remittances received also increase. In the second stage, more and more migrants decide to go to a specific destination country, and the concentration of those leaving ranges from 10-12% to 19-22%. The volume of personal remittances sent from the receiving country to the donor country continues to grow, while the volume received begins to decline or stagnate. In the third stage, the share of those leaving for a given country begins to exceed 19-22%, while at the same time the share of migrants relative to the population of the receiving country increases. In the third stage, econometric analysis suggests that the volume of personal remittances sent home by migrants actually declines.

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Appendix

Appendix 1. Bilateral remittances

Donor county

(below)

Recipient country

Russia

Germany

US

Austria

UK

Japan

Netherlands

Switzerland

India

Brazil

China

Others

Russia

 

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

2006–2021

Note 5

Germany

1992–2021

 

1972–2021

1972–2021

1972–2007

1972–2021

1972–2021

1972–2021

1972–2021

1972–2021

1972–2021

Note 6

US

2006–2021

1972–2012

 

1995–2021

1999–2021

2003–2021

2004–2021

 

2003–2021

2003–2021

2003–2021

Note 7

Austria

2006–2021

1972–2021

1995–2021

 

1995–2021

 

1995–2021

1995–2021

     

Note 8

UK

2006–2021

1972–2008

1999–2021

1995–2021

 

1999–2021

 

1999–2021

1999–2021

1999–2021

1999–2021

Note 9

Japan

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

1999–2021

 

2004–2021

       

 

Netherlands

2006–2021

1972–2021

2004–2021

1995–2021

 

2004–2021

         

 

Brazil  

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

1999–2021

           

 

Canada

2006–2021

1972–2013

2003–2021

 

1999–2021

           

 

China

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

1999–2021

           

 

France

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

1995–2021

             

 

India

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

1999–2021

           

 

Italy

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

1995–2021

             

 

Switzerland

2006–2021

1972–2021

 

1995–2021

1999–2021

           

 

Argentina

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Australia

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Belgium

2006–2021

1982–2021

2003–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Croatia

2006–2021

1992–2021

 

1995–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hungary

2006–2021

1972–2021

 

1995–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Luxembourg

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mexico

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Poland

2006–2021

1972–2021

 

1995–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Romania

2006–2021

1972–2021

 

1995–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Singapore

2006–2021

1972–2021

2003–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Slovenia

2006–2021

1992–2021

 

1995–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Spain

2006–2021

1972–2021

 

1995–2021

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Others

Note 1

Note 2

Note 3

Note 4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Notes:

1 - Cash remittances to Russia in the period 2006-2021. From the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Curaçao, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Island, North Korea, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, Uruguay, US, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (UK), Virgin Islands (United States), Wallis and Futuna Islands, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

2 - Cash remittances to Germany between 1972 and 2012 (unless otherwise stated) from the following countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland (1973-2018), Latvia (1992-2021), Lithuania (1992-2021), Liechtenstein (1995-2021), Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey;

3 - Cash remittances to the United States between 2003 and 2021 from the following countries: China, Hong Kong SAR, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan SAR, Venezuela;

4 - Cash remittances to Austria in the period 1995-2021 from the following countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia;

5 - Cash remittances from Russia in the period 2006-2021 to the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Curaçao, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Island, North Korea, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan SAR, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican City, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (British), Virgin Islands (U.S.), Wallis and Futuna, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

6 - Cash remittances from Germany between 1972 and 2012 (unless otherwise stated) to the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium (1982-2021), Bulgaria, Canada (1992-2013), Croatia, Cyprus (1992-2021), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland (1993-2018), Italy (1992-2016, 1993-2018), Latvia (1992-2013, 1992-2001, 1992-2021), Liechtenstein (1995-2021), Lithuania (1992-2021), Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia (1992-2021), Spain (1972-2016, 1992-2003, 1992-2016), Sweden, Turkey (1992-2021), United Kingdom (1993-2018);

7 - Cash remittances from the United States between 2003 and 2021 to the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Mexico, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan SAR, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Venezuela;

8 - Cash remittances from Austria in the period 1995-2021 to the following countries: Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain;

9 - Cash remittances from the UK in the period 1999-2021 to the following countries: Canada, Hong Kong SAR.

Appendix 2. Correlation matrix

 

lsent

lreceived

lmstock

RecGrowth

DonGrowth

diffGDP

lfx

gini

ltrade

RecCrisis

DonCrisis

ldist

colony

comlang

shareleav

shareleav2

shareleav3

mig_pop

mig_pop2

mig_pop3

lsent

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lreceived

0.8401*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lmstock

0.7230*

0.6559*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RecGrowth

-0.0738*

-0.0359*

-0.1421*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DonGrowth

-0.0376*

-0.0727*

0.0225*

0.1398*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

diffGDP

0.0736*

-0.0767*

0.1594*

-0.0441*

0.0464*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lfx

-0.0232

0.0252*

0.1431*

-0.0926*

0.0930*

0.3083*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

gini

-0.2150*

-0.0855*

-0.1966*

-0.0778*

-0.0003

-0.2338*

0.0362*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ltrade

0.8006*

0.7996*

0.6609*

-0.0352*

-0.0334*

-0.0062

0.0016

-0.3249*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RecCrisis

-0.0306*

-0.0362*

0.0136

-0.7062*

-0.1378*

-0.0114

0.0595*

0.2030*

-0.0590*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DonCrisis

-0.0371*

-0.0308*

-0.0694*

-0.1374*

-0.7047*

0.0105

-0.0597*

0.0418*

-0.0584*

0.1640*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ldist

-0.4020*

-0.4067*

-0.3808*

0.0345*

0.0358*

0.0019

0.0014

0.4404*

-0.3484*

0.0340*

0.0329*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

colony

0.2405*

0.2342*

0.4112*

-0.0130

-0.0087

-0.0067

0.0043

-0.0780*

0.1338*

-0.0059

-0.0062

-0.2934*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

comlang

0.3112*

0.3055*

0.2652*

0.0021

0.0060

-0.0062

0.0042

-0.0584*

0.2601*

-0.0245*

-0.0241*

-0.1144*

0.2255*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

shareleav

0.3843*

0.2434*

0.5198*

-0.0299*

0.0127

0.1696*

0.0033

-0.0850*

0.2697*

0.0017

-0.0165*

-0.1942*

0.4246*

0.1965*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

 

shareleav2

0.2571*

0.1401*

0.3703*

-0.0154

0.0137

0.1414*

0.0010

-0.0187

0.1571*

0.0040

-0.0089

-0.1042*

0.3174*

0.1018*

0.9236*

1.0000

 

 

 

 

shareleav3

0.2007*

0.1037*

0.2901*

-0.0077

0.0124

0.1218*

0.0039

0.0008

0.1215*

0.0006

-0.0066

-0.0638*

0.2225*

0.0676*

0.8040*

0.9638*

1.0000

 

 

 

mig_pop

0.2223*

0.2187*

0.3345*

-0.0103

-0.0250*

0.0302*

0.0332*

-0.0951*

0.1218*

-0.0202*

0.0239*

-0.2116*

0.4700*

0.1751*

0.1731*

0.1241*

0.1035*

1.0000

 

 

mig_pop2

0.1014*

0.1025*

0.1956*

-0.0049

-0.0217*

-0.0041

0.0248*

-0.0476*

0.0384*

-0.0121

0.0252*

-0.1164*

0.3280*

0.1059*

0.0708*

0.0310*

0.0179*

0.9102*

1.0000

 

mig_pop3

0.0739*

0.0727*

0.1438*

-0.0011

-0.0221*

-0.0048

0.0195*

-0.0367*

0.0196

-0.0102

0.0259*

-0.0842*

0.2503*

0.0811*

0.0433*

0.0106

0.0008

0.7965*

0.9679*

1.0000

Note: * - significance of coefficient estimates at 10% level, respectively. Source: author’s calculations using STATA14 package

Appendix 3. Recipient-donor country pairs in the first stage of migration since 1972

Russia-Montenegro

Russia-Serbia

Russia-Angola

Russia-Republic of Congo

Russia-Gibraltar

Russia-Guinea

Russia-Guatemala

Russia-Mauritania

Russia-Mauritania

Russia-Niger

Russia-Nicaragua

Russia-Qatar

Russia-Saudi Arabia

Russia-Singapore

Russia-Tajikistan

Russia-British Virgin Islands

Russia-Vanuatu

Russia-Turks and Caicos Islands

Russia-Andorra

Russia-Malaysia

Argentina-Germany

Argentina-Russia

Argentina-US

Armenia-Russia

American Samoa-Russia

Antigua and Barbuda-Russia

Australia-Germany

Australia-Russia

Australia-US

Austria-Switzerland

Austria-Germany

Austria-Spain

Austria-France

Austria-United Kingdom

Austria-Hungary

Austria-Italy

Austria-Netherlands

Austria-Poland

Austria-Romania

Austria-Russia

Austria-Slovakia

Austria-US

Azerbaijan-Russia

Burundi-Russia

Belgium-Germany

Belgium-Russia

Belgium-US

Benin-Russia

Burkina Faso-Russia

Bangladesh-Russia

Bulgaria-Germany

Bulgaria-Russia

Bahrain-Russia

Bosnia and Herzegovina-Russia

Belize-Russia

Bermuda-Russia

Bolivia-Russia

Brazil-Germany

Brazil-United Kingdom

Brazil-Russia

Brazil-US

Barbados-Russia

Brunei-Russia

Botswana-Russia

CAR-Russia

Canada-Germany

Canada-Russia

Switzerland-Germany

Switzerland-United Kingdom

Switzerland-Russia

Chile-Russia

China-Germany

China-UK

China-Russia

China-United States

Côte d’Ivoire-Russia

Cameroon-Russia

Congo, DR-Russia

Republic of Congo-Russia

Colombia-Russia

Cape Verde-Russia

Costa Rica-Russia

Cuba-Russia

Curaçao-Russia

Cayman Islands-Russia

Cyprus-Germany

Cyprus-Russia

Czech Republic-Austria

Czech Republic-Russia

Germany-Argentina

Germany-Australia

Germany-Belgium

Germany-Brazil

Germany-Canada

Germany-China

Germany-Cyprus

Germany-Finland

Germany-France

Germany-UK

Germany-India

Germany-Ireland

Germany-Iceland

Germany-Japan

Germany-Liechtenstein

Germany-Morocco

Germany-Mexico

Germany-Malta

Germany-Malaysia

Germany-Russia

Germany-Singapore

Germany-Sweden

Germany-US

Djibouti-Russia

Dominica-Russia

Denmark-Germany

Denmark-Russia

Dominican Republic-Russia

Algeria-Russia

Ecuador-Russia

Egypt-Russia

Eritrea-Russia

Spain-Austria

Spain-Germany

Spain-Russia

Estonia-Germany

Ethiopia-Russia

Finland-Germany

Finland-Russia

Fiji-Russia

France-Austria

France-Germany

France-Russia

France-US

Micronesia-Russia

Gabon-Russia

UK-Austria

UK-Brazil

UK-Canada

UK-Switzerland

UK-China

UK-Germany

UK-India

UK-Japan

UK-Russia

Ghana-Russia

Gibraltar-Russia

Guinea-Russia

Guinea-Bissau-Russia

Equatorial Guinea-Russia

Greece-Germany

Greece-Russia

Grenada-Russia

Greenland-Russia

Guatemala-Russia

Guam-Russia

Guyana-Russia

Hong Kong SAR, China-United States

Honduras-Russia

Croatia-Austria

Croatia-Germany

Croatia-Russia

Haiti-Russia

Hungary-Austria

Hungary-Germany

Hungary-Russia

Indonesia-Russia

Isle of Man-Russia

India-Germany

India-UK

India-Russia

India-US

Ireland-Germany

Ireland-Russia

Iran-Russia

Iraq-Russia

Iceland-Germany

Iceland-Russia

Italy-Austria

Italy-Germany

Italy-Russia

Italy-US

Jamaica-Russia

Jordan-Russia

Japan-Germany

Japan-UK

Japan-Netherlands

Japan-Russia

Japan-US

Kenya-Russia

Cambodia-Russia

Kiribati Russia

Korea-Russia

Korea-US

Kuwait-Russia

Lao PDR-Russia

Lebanon-Russia

Liberia-Russia

Libya-Russia

Liechtenstein-Russia

Sri Lanka-Russia

Lesotho-Russia

Lithuania-Germany

Luxembourg-Russia

Luxembourg-US

Latvia-Germany

Macao SAR, China-Russia

Morocco-Germany

Morocco-Russia

Monaco-Russia

Madagascar-Russia

Maldives-Russia

Mexico-Germany

Mexico-Russia

Marshall Islands-Russia

North Macedonia-Russia

Mali-Russia

Malta-Germany

Malta-Russia

Myanmar-Russia

Montenegro-Russia

Mongolia-Russia

Northern Mariana Islands-Russia

Mozambique-Russia

Mauritania-Russia

Mauritius-Russia

Malawi-Russia

Malaysia-Germany

Malaysia-Russia

Namibia-Russia

New Caledonia-Russia

Niger-Russia

Nigeria-Russia

Nicaragua-Russia

Netherlands-Austria

Netherlands-Germany

Netherlands-Japan

Netherlands-Russia

Netherlands-US

Norway-Germany

Norway-Russia

Nepal-Russia

New Zealand-Russia

Oman-Russia

Pakistan-Russia

Panama-Russia

Peru-Russia

Philippines-Russia

Palau-Russia

Papua New Guinea-Russia

Poland-Austria

Poland-Germany

Poland-Russia

Puerto Rico-Russia

DPRK-Russia

Portugal-Germany

Portugal-Russia

Paraguay-Russia

French Polynesia-Russia

Qatar-Russia

Romania-Austria

Romania-Germany

Romania-Russia

Russia-Aruba

Russia-Afghanistan

Russia-Angola

Russia-Albania

Russia-Andorra

Russia-UAE

Russia-Argentina

Russia-American Samoa

Russia-Antigua and Barbuda

Russia-Australia

Russia-Austria

Russia-Burundi

Russia-Belgium

Russia-Benin

Russia-Burkina Faso

Russia-Bangladesh

Russia-Bulgaria

Russia-Bahrain

Russia-Bahrain

Russia-Bosnia and Herzegovina

Russia-Belize

Russia-Bermuda

Russia-Bolivia

Russia-Brazil

Russia-Barbados

Russia-Brunei

Russia-Brunei

Russia-Botswana

Russia-CAR

Russia-Canada

Russia-Switzerland

Russia-Chile

Russia-China

Russia-Côte d’Ivoire

Russia-Cameroon

Russia-Congo, DR

Russia-Republic of Congo

Russia-Colombia

Russia-Costa Rica

Russia-Cuba

Russia-Cayman Islands

Russia-Cyprus

Russia-Czech Republic

Russia-Germany

Russia-Djibouti

Russia-Dominica

Russia-Denmark

Russia-Dominican Republic

Russia-Algeria

Russia-Ecuador

Russia-Egypt

Russia-Eritrea

Russia-Spain

Russia-Ethiopia

Russia-Finland

Russia-Fiji

Russia-France

Russia-Micronesia

Russia-Gabon

Russia-UK

Russia-Ghana

Russia-Guinea

Russia-Guinea

Russia-Guinea-Bissau

Russia-Equatorial Guinea

Russia-Greece

Russia-Grenada

Russia-Greenland

Russia-Guatemala

Russia-Guam

Russia-Guyana

Russia-Honduras

Russia-Croatia

Russia-Haiti

Russia-Hungary

Russia-Indonesia

Russia-India

Russia-Ireland

Russia-Iran

Russia-Iraq

Russia-Iceland

Russia-Israel

Russia-Italy

Russia-Jamaica

Russia-Jordan

Russia-Japan

Russia-Kenya

Russia-Cambodia

Russia-Kiribati

Russia-Korea

Russia-Kuwait

Russia-Laos PDR

Russia-Lebanon

Russia-Liberia

Russia-Libya

Russia-Liechtenstein

Russia-Sri Lanka

Russia-Lesotho

Russia-Luxembourg

Russia-SAR Macao, China

Russia-Morocco

Russia-Monaco

Russia-Madagascar

Russia-Maldives

Russia-Mexico

Russia-Marshall Islands

Russia-Mongolia

Russia-Mali

Russia-Malta

Russia-Myanmar

Russia-North Macedonia

Russia-Northern Mariana Islands

Russia-Mozambique

Russia-Mauritania

Russia-Mauritius

Russia-Malawi

Russia-Malaysia

Russia-Namibia

Russia-New Caledonia

Russia-Niger

Russia-Nigeria

Russia-Nicaragua

Russia-Netherlands

Russia-Norway

Russia-Nepal

Russia-New Zealand

Russia-Oman

Russia-Pakistan

Russia-Panama

Russia-Peru

Russia-Philippines

Russia-Palau

Russia-Papua New Guinea

Russia-Poland

Russia-Puerto Rico

Russia-DPRK

Russia-Portugal

Russia-Paraguay

Russia - French Polynesia

Russia-Qatar

Russia-Romania

Russia-Rwanda

Russia-Saudi Arabia

Russia-São Tomé and Principe

Russia-Solomon Islands

Russia-Singapore

Russia-Senegal

Russia-Sudan

Russia-El Salvador

Russia-San Marino

Russia-Somali

Russia-Sierra Leone

Russia-Slovakia

Russia-Slovenia

Russia-Sweden

Russia-Eswatini

Russia-Seychelles

Russia-Syria

Russia-Chad

Russia-Togo

Russia-Thailand

Russia-East Timor

Russia-Tonga

Russia-Trinidad and Tobago

Russia-Tunisia

Russia-Turkey

Russia-Tanzania

Russia-Uganda

Russia-Uruguay

Russia-United States

Russia-Venezuela, RB

Russia-Virgin Islands (United States)

Russia-Vietnam

Russia-Vanuatu

Russia-Samoa

Russia-Yemen

Russia-South Africa

Russia-Zambia

Russia-Zimbabwe

Rwanda-Russia

Saudi Arabia-Russia

Sao Tome and Principe-Russia

Senegal-Russia

Singapore-Germany

Singapore-Russia

Singapore-US

Solomon Islands-Russia

Sierra Leone-Russia

El Salvador-Russia

San Marino-Russia

Somalia-Russia

Serbia-Russia

South Sudan-Russia

Sudan-Russia

Slovakia-Austria

Slovakia-Russia

Slovenia-Austria

Slovenia-Germany

Slovenia-Russia

Sweden-Germany

Sweden-Russia

Eswatini-Russia

Seychelles-Russia

Syria-Russia

Turks and Caicos Islands-Russia

Chad-Russia

Togo-Russia

Thailand-Russia

East Timor-Russia

Tonga-Russia

Trinidad and Tobago-Russia

Tunisia-Russia

Turkey-Germany

Turkey-Russia

Tuvalu-Russia

Tanzania-Russia

Uganda-Russia

Uruguay-Russia

United States- Virgin Islands - Russia

Venezuela, RB-Russia

Venezuela, RB-United States

British Virgin Islands-Russia

 United States-Russia

Vietnam-Russia

Vanuatu-Russia

Samoa-Russia

Yemen-Russia

South Africa-Russia

South Africa-United States

Zambia-Russia

Zimbabwe-Russia

 

 

 

Notes

1 Including: SDG 1 (No poverty), SDG 2 (Zero hunger), SDG 3 (Good health and well-being), SDG 4 (Quality education), SDG 5 (Gender equality), SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth), SDG 10 (Reduced inequality), SDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities), SDG 13 (Climate action), SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions), and SDG 17 (Partnership for the Goals).

2 Key rates changed significantly after the transition to the Jamaican monetary system and then underwent significant changes as countries merged into regional groupings or, conversely, as one country split into two or more independent states, or as the currency moved from a floating to a fixed exchange rate or vice versa. Therefore, in the context of analyzing a large number of countries of the world in the long run, a significant rate increase/decrease is not always an indicator of the business cycle in the economy. In addition, in most countries of the world, key interest rate statistics are available only from the 1990s onwards, which limits the sample.

3 National Bank of Austria (Oesterreichische Nationalbank): indicator — debit and credit of the secondary income balance of the current account of the balance of payments; Bank of England: indicator — debit and credit of the secondary income balance of the current account of the balance of payments; German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank): indicator — debit and credit of the balance of secondary income of the current account of the balance of payments; Netherlands Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank): indicator — debit and credit of the balance of secondary income of the current account of the balance of payments; Bank of Russia: indicator — cross-border transfers of individuals (residents and non-residents); Bureau of Economic Analysis: indicator — international transactions (secondary account).

4 The equations are constructed with other things being equal, ceteris paribus. Since both dependent variables LSentit and LReceivedit are natural logarithms of the original variables Sentit and Receivedit, for graphical interpretation all four functions were respectively transformed through the inverse exponential function ex. The range of acceptable values of the variable shareleavit is from 0 (migrants did not go to the recipient country) to 100 (all migrants from the donor country go to the recipient country).

5 This is, for example, fundamentally characteristic of migration from Mexico to the United States, and from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to Russia. This situation was also observed for the migration of Turks to Germany in the 1980s.

6 This may also be related to the growth of entrepreneurial activity of migrants at home, i.e. when transfers start to have an investment character rather than being aimed at supporting the welfare of relatives, but this character of transfers is usually reflected not in the current but in the capital account of the country’s balance of payments and is not the subject of this study.

7 Since both dependent variables LSentit и LReceivedit are natural logarithms of the original variables Sentit и Receivedit, For graphical interpretation, all four functions were respectively transformed through an inverse exponential function ex. The range of permissible values of the variable mig_popit is from 0 (migrants do not live in the recipient country) to 22 (maximum share of migrants from a certain country in relation to the population of the recipient country—was typical of Russian migrants in Estonia in the 1980s and 1990s and Kazakhstan in the 1970s).

8   This is, for example, fundamentally characteristic for migration to Russia from Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine.